By: Arash Momenian

Equatorial Guinea is a special place. In official documents, it is referred to as Republic of Equatorial Guinea. The official language is French, Spanish, and local dialects. It has a population of about half a million, 24,000 of whom are exiles and 8,900 persons are inmates in jails. In addition, abduction of people is ordinary and run-of-the-mill. An interesting personality of that country is Francisco Macías Nguema, the first president of Equatorial Guinea who paved the way for a single party and then a single ethnic government in that country after it gained independence from Spain in 1968. Then, in a strange measure, he transferred the treasury to his birthplace at a village. His family still rules the country and the current president, Teodore Obiang Nguema Mbasogo, is his nephew who staged a coup against his uncle in 1979. Of course, the coup failed to change the situation.

Today, the government of Equatorial Guinea holds public elections for the president, but there has been only one candidate throughout all those elections, who has never got less than 90 percent of votes. Guess who? So, why when you read international press, you are sure to come across something about the younger dictatorship of Robert Mugabe in Zimbabwe, but nobody save for experts on Africa, has much information on Equatorial Guinea? The reason is a scourge called oil and its aftermath in the Equatorial Guinea. Since discovery of oil in this country (under President Obiang), Equatorial Guinea has been rapidly growing in economic terms, though this has been only confirmed by state statistics. After Nigeria and Angola, the Equatorial Guinea is the third exporter of crude oil in Africa, sending out 360,000 barrels per day. According to figures released by the World Bank, oil revenues of the country have increased from 3 million dollars in 1993 to 190 million dollars in 2000 and 3.3 billion dollars in 2006. The annual rate at which gross domestic product grows has reached 15.3 percent by 2006 (though it has fallen to 6.8 percent in the past two years). However, the people of Equatorial Guinea are living on an average income of one dollar per day and even the capital city, Malabo, lacks sewerage and the city’s health situation is very dangerous.

Human development growth in Equatorial Guinea ranks 120 among 177 countries despite its low population. According to Oil and Gas magazine, the country has an estimated stock of 1.1 billion barrels of crude oil. Under these conditions, elections in Equatorial Guinea reflect the reverse relationship between oil and democracy. After the president (who has the power to pass laws, appoint and depose ministers and unlimited powers in other fields) ordered a multiparty system to be established in 1991, publicity programs of so-called opposition figures have been always accompanied with such programs as distributing luxurious things like satellite dishes, flat panel televisions, and money among the audience. In one of those programs in 2006, the national radio of Equatorial Guinea reported that 46,000 dollars had been handed out among people who usually earn less than a dollar a day. The interesting point is that all so-called opposition candidates read out statements in the name of Obiang and eulogize him. In 2000, all opposition candidates withdrew from elections in his favor. Such measures are just aimed to pay tribute to a person who undertakes all costs of such programs by spending petrodollars. An official report by the US Senate had it that, at least, 35 million dollars of the country’s oil revenues had been transferred to Obiang’s personal account through a notorious financial institute in Washington.

Of course, the scourge of oil does not affect all countries in the same way. In fact, the Equatorial Guinea has never had the opportunity to witness establishment of civil institutions which would promote democracy. But other countries have had the opportunity to form certain institutions which have helped them to move in the direction of democracy. However, gradual untoward effects of oil on democratic indexes follow a different model in every country. On the other hand, as Kevin K. Tsui, professor of University of Chicago, has said in his research on the relationship between oil and democracy, untoward effects of oil discovery are limited to countries which lack democratic indexes (like Saudi Arabia and some sheikdoms in the Persian Gulf) and those countries where democracy has not been institutionalized due to various political and historical reasons (like Venezuela). Meanwhile, oil discovery has not had any negative effect on those countries where democratic traditions are powerful (like Norway and the United States).

According to Tsui’s observations, oil discovery in the first and second groups of countries has even caused regression of democratic process and those effects can be traced, at least, for 30 years. On the other hand, according to the same evidence, discovery of oil reserves of approximately 100 billion barrels will retard various democratic indexes of those countries by 30 percent. Of course, the costs undertaken for discovery, extraction, and quality of oil influence overall benefits of autocratic governments through oil sales and are, therefore, influential on the model according to which democratic indexes decline. This means that where oil quality is higher and exploitation costs are lower, the reverse relationship between oil and democracy can be ascertained more easily. This is quite evident in graphs which are drawn in order to show this point. If we drew a graph with vertical axis reflecting democratic indexes at a scale of zero to one and horizontal axis reflecting the volume of discovered oil; in those areas where oil quality is higher or extraction costs are lower (like Middle East where the cost of extracting each barrel of oil is approximately 2 dollars), countries near the upper end of the graph, that is, near 1 on graph’s scale (with 1 reflecting complete and stable democracy) would be near zero on the axis which reflects the volume of discovered oil.

On the contrary, countries, which are away from the vertical axis (that is, oil rich countries), stand at a lower level in terms of democratic indexes. In this way, in regional models, if we drew a line between situation of country A with the lowest oil resources and country B with the highest oil resources, other countries should be situated above or below this assumed line. The ratio of countries which are situated above the line to those that are situated below it should reflect quality of extracted oil or low costs of production. Graphs drawn by Tsui in his research confirm the assumption of reverse relationship between oil and democracy. On the Middle East graph, where extraction costs are low, the only countries which do not follow suit with this model are Turkey and Iran and this can be easily attributed to beginning of civil movements in both countries before oil discovery. In Eurasia and Central Asia where costs are a little higher, the ratio of countries above and below the line is nearly 1 while in high-cost areas like Africa and Latin America, there are more countries above the line compared to those below it. Despite situation of type two countries (whose index of democracy stands at 0.35 to 0.65) gradual undermining of democratic institutions as a result of high oil revenues should not be ignored, especially that change in indexes is manifested over a time period of 30 years and the situation of these countries on the existing graphs cannot be taken as stable. International oil price is another factor which undermines democracy.